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AND ECONOMICS
Mark A. Sargent
Introduction
One of the dominant modes of discourse in the legal academy today is that of the law and
economics movement. Having long ago burst the bounds of market-oriented subject areas such
as contracts, property, business associations and antitrust, law and economics has tackled
everything from family law to criminal law to constitutional law.1 The discipline has not only
reconceptualized those spheres of experience as markets, it has invaded the traditional spheres of
political theory and jurisprudence to redefine the proper role of law.
Its goal in all these spheres is not just descriptive or analytic. Law and economics has
become prescriptive or normative, employing the concept of social welfare as a substitute for
more traditional notions of fairness, morality or justice in defining what legal rules should be
preferred. In its view, the goal of law and individual legal rules should be the maximization of
social welfare as an aggregate of the preferences or utilities of individuals, whatever they may
be.2 A legal rule maximizes social welfare, to the extent it maximizes in the aggregate individual
preferences or utilities, and hence the well-being of individuals.
This concept of social welfare is much broader than the wealth maximization norm
originally associated with law and economics, which asserted prescriptively that “law should
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seek to increase social wealth, as measured by the dollar equivalents of everything in society.”3
It rests instead on a more comprehensive notion of what an individual might value, and can
include not just goods, services or power (wealth in the narrow sense), but also “environmental
amenities, personally held notions of fulfillment, sympathetic feelings for others,”4 and even a
“taste for a notion of fairness.”5 Even this more comprehensive concept of utility, however,
avoids any attempt to distinguish among preferences in terms of relative value or worth.
Preferences are what they are, and an individual’s well-being depends entirely on legal rules’
ability to enable individuals to realize their preferences. One preference, or end, is as good as
any other. There is certainly no hierarchy of ends.6 Law and economics, thus, is value-neutral; it
is emphatically not a meditation upon the Good.
Law and economics does assume, however, thateconomic actors are rational in the
pursuit of their preferences.7 According to rational choice theory, they will make choices that
maximize their ability to achieve their ends.8 Law and economics simply does not make
judgments about the rationality of those ends. It also does not judge them against a set of values.
In fact, it repudiates judgment about those ends, or about the effects of legal rules, in terms of
3
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“fairness” or, presumably, any other value extrinsic to the individuals’ preferences.9 When being
prescriptive, law and economics is prescriptive only its own terms - - maximization of social
welfare conceived of as the aggregation of individual utility maximizations10 - - and not through
the application of moral norms developed philosophically or through religious belief.
If that is true, what possible relationship can there be between law and economics and a
jurisprudence grounded in Catholicism? A Catholic jurisprudence may draw on different sources
of inspiration such as Scripture, natural law, Thomas Aquinas, the Magisterium of the Church,
Catholic social thought or any combination of those approaches, but all presume the knowability
of the Good. While recognizing that no human social, political or legal arrangements in the
fallen world can embody the Good, Catholic thought hardly shares the indifference to ends
central to the utility maximization norm. A Catholic jurisprudence will ultimately be about ends.
It will make judgments about the values implicit in those ends, and will critique and prescribe
legal rules on the basis of those judgments. Nothing could be less like law and economics.
If that is true, should it be said that law and economics and a Catholic jurisprudence are
in conflict, or at least engaged in fundamentally different enterprises? This paper will address
that question first, in Part I, by elaborating upon the irrelevance of values in both the descriptive
and prescriptive modes of law and economics. Part II will describe an argument by Stephen
Bainbridge, a noted Catholic law and economics scholar, who believes that law and economics
possesses a deep affinity, or at least consistency with the Catholic world view.11 In Part III I will
argue, in contrast to Bainbridge, that law and economics, at least in its prescriptive mode, while
9
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useful, is ultimately inadequate from a Catholic jurisprudential perspective. I will conclude by
urging greater attention to a richer, and Catholic-inspired conception of economics.
I.

The Irrelevance of Values
The irrelevance of judgments about values to rational choice theory is one of its defining

characteristics. In rational choice theory’s world of utility-maximizing individuals engaged in
market relations, values are merely data. They are simply economic actors’ preferences or tastes,
and of little importance for purposes of economic analysis. The key point is that in the idealtypical world of the market, self-interest rules, however that self-interest is defined. Even
altruism – an apparent contradiction to self-interest – is merely disguised selfishness. The
human agent’s welfare is measured solely by the extent to which those preferences are satisfied:
“How well-off an individual is, is the same thing as how well-satisfied an individual’s
preferences are. Orthodox normative economics consequently identifies welfare and preference
satisfaction.”12 The economist does not make judgments of value about those preferences;13 the
only judgment the economist can sustain is that of efficiency, which is “conceived as the
appraisal of the adequacy of means in view of the maximum (possible) achievement of the
12
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interests of the participants in the market game,”14 or, in simple terms, acting “without wasting
money.”15
Economists thus seem to be making relatively modest claims. Rational choice theory is
simply a tool useful for predicting how people will respond to choices; it is “emphatically not a
moral norm,”16 and is essentially descriptive in its function. Richard Posner’s claim that homo
economicus “is a person whose behavior is completely determined by incentives; his rationality
is no different from that of a pigeon or a rat,”17 thus does not pretend to be a moral or a
normative statement. It purports to be only a description of the autonomous individual’s practice
of making rational choices that maximize her preferences.
This is not to suggest, however, that economics is non-normative. Indeed, it is normative
economics that is most concerned with law. The body of legal theory known as law and
economics has both descriptive (or positive) and normative (or prescriptive) dimensions in the
questions it asks about legal rules.18 As one leading law and economics theorist, Steven Shavell,
puts it in a basic, mainstream law and economics textbook,
One type of question is descriptive, concerning the effects of legal rules on
behavior and outcomes. For example, will liability for causing car accidents result
in fewer accidents? The other type of question is normative, concerning the social
desirability of legal rules. Thus, we might ask whether liability for car accidents is
socially desirable, given its effect on the incidence of accidents, the compensation
of accident victims, and the costs of the legal system.19
14
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Whether something is “socially desirable” depends on whether it maximizes social welfare. The
concept of social welfare used in law and economics derives from rational choice theory and its
value-neutral position on individual preferences in applying the utilitymaximization norm. In
defining the law and economics’ understanding of social welfare, Shavell explains that:
First, the notion of the utility or well-being of a person is completely general and
includes everything that a person cares about. Second, the concept of a measure of
social welfare is built up from the utilities of individuals and is presumed not to
depend on factors other than their utilities.20
The measure of social welfare thus is a function of the individual preferences of the
rational, utility- maximizing individuals effected by a legal rule. Considerations of fairness (or
any other deontological principle), which are frequently a basis for normative evaluation of legal
rules, are irrelevant, because fairness and the efficient maximization of individual utilities are
apples and oranges. Notions of fairness, Shavell argues,
Typically…are not defined in terms of the well being of individuals and are, in
fact, not dependent on the consequences of their use. For instance, the idea that
punishment should reflect the gravity of the act is not premised on how
proportionality of the punishment affects the well-being of any person or on
whether it promotes deterrence or incapacitation….Because the goal of satisfying
notions of fairness is different from advancing the utilities of individuals, pursuit
of the goal can lead to the reduction of individuals’ well-being.21

This is hardly a desirable outcome in Shavell’s view.
Indeed…in principle, the pursuit of any notion of the social good that is not based
positively and exclusively on the well-being of individuals will, in some
circumstances make everyone worse off: all individuals will want policy A to be
chosen over policy B, yet the notion of the social good will require B to be
chosen. This result implies that a person who wants to respect the unanimous
choices of individuals must, on grounds of consistency, reject any notion of the
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social good that does not depend positively and exclusively on the utilities of
individuals.22
From Shavell’s perspective, the introduction of moral principles into decision-making is almost
perverse, at least when the choices of the individuals involved in a transaction are thereby
disregarded
Fairness, Shavell concedes, may have some limited, instrumental uses in economic
analysis of law. For example, individuals may have a “taste” or preference for fairness, such as a
desire to have the punishment fit the crime.23 That taste enters into the economic analysis,
however, as just another individual utility, and is not in any sense privileged. “Fairness” is not a
separate normative consideration external to or superior to the efficiency analysis. As Shavell
puts it, fairness would not “have normative weight independently of whether… individuals
…happen to have a taste for satisfaction of the notions [of fairness].”24 Shavell is grateful,
however, that notions of fairness do exist in society: “Were people not to have moral notions
instilled in them, it is apparent that society as we know it could not function. These notions are
actually very useful from the point of view of welfare economics, so it is desirable that
individuals believe in these notions of fairness and that social resources be employed to instill
them.”25 Shavell’s concession is thus quite limited, and he is not at all interested in the nature,
origins or extent of those useful “moral notions,” and they are not relevant to the determination
of social welfare. He concludes that whatever usefulness such notions might have, that

22
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usefulness “does not imply that an analyst, in thinking about legal policy, should give a notion of
fairness independent weight of its own.”26
This principle of strict adherence to the utilitymaximization norm, however, should not
be regarded as methodological modesty, or as recognition of a limit on the usefulness or scope of
economic analysis of law. To the contrary, it is an aggressive, almost imperialistic assumption
that fairness or other deontological principles applied in traditional jurisprudence and philosophy
are inferior to welfare economics and should be supplanted. In short, the norm is central to law
and economics’ conception of a better society.
Despite its analytical purity, the categorical assumption of the supremacy of the utility
maximization norm has been qualified somewhat in the law and economics literature. In the
course of a defense of the norm, Bainbridge acknowledges that
[a]lmost from the beginning … important law & economic scholars asserted that
the wealth maximization norm could be trumped by what Guido Calabresi called
“Other Justice” norms. That position now prevails in the law and economics
community. Even Judge Posner concedes (albeit with qualifications) that
economic analysis sometimes can be trumped by non-economic norms.27
This concession, however, tends to be a grudging one. While recognizing in theory that “Other
Justice” norms should sometimes prevail in the evaluation of legal rules, economists often
emphasize what Bainbridge calls “the thorny problem of implementation.”28 For example, law
and economics scholars frequently employ public choice theory to show that legislativelycreated legal rules reflect the preferences of intensely-focused interest groups with high stakes in
the outcome, rather than the interests of larger, more diffuse groups (such as consumers or public
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shareholders) whose interests legislators theoretically should be protecting.29 This kind of
problem can lead a theorist such as Bainbridge to conclude that “although in theory I
acknowledge the need to permit other normative values to trump wealth maximization, in
practice I am deeply suspicious of claims that Other Justice norms should prevail.”30 Assertions
of fairness, of “the public interest,” social justice and equality thus are often perceived with in
the law and economics tradition as masks for self-interest, as rhetorical dodges deflecting
attention from the play of conflicting interests.
How does all this fit with a Catholic perspective on law? A useful basis of comparison
may be between law and economics and Catholic social thought31 with its broad implications for
a huge variety of social questions within the province of law. Because of their concern with
many of the same issues - - the nature of property, the purpose and proper functioning of
economic life, the relationship of the state to the economy, the relationship of superior and
subsidiary authorities, and much more - - it can be said that Catholic social thought and law and
economics are playing in the same field. But do they have any relationship beyond that?
At first blush, there would not seem to be an important place for Catholic social thought,
with its insistence on evaluating social arrangements in accordance with moral and spiritual
principles, in the law and economics universe. In the Catholic universe the nature of ends or
preferences is not irrelevant. Perhaps Catholic social thought can, at best, serve as a source of
one of those elusive “Other Justice” considerations that, at least theoretically, trump the utility
29
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maximization norm, especially in non-market contexts. It may reflect a taste, or preference
within an individual’s utility determination. It may serve merely as means for guiding the
distribution of wealth after economics resolves the serious questions of wealth creation.
Fundamentally, however, the complex of interlinked assumptions about human nature, the nature
of the common good, and the proper measure of a just economy and just society that constitute
Catholic social thought seem to be of marginal relevance to law and economics.
There is, however, a more sanguine view of their possible relationship.
II.

A Catholic Defense of Law and Economics
There is a body of Catholic opinion that asserts a deep consistency between Catholic

thinking about the economy and society and neoclassical economics in general and law and
economics in particular. Most notable is the work of Michael Novak and Stephen Bainbridge.
I have considered Novak’s claims elsewhere,32 and will not elaborate on them here, but
will emphasize his key points, which are actually quite simple. Novak asserts that conception of
human dignity essential to Catholic thought requires a robust conception of human freedom.
Human freedom, he argues, is found only in the democratic capitalist system that maintains the
separate sovereignty of the economic, political and cultural/associative spheres. Only this full
elaboration of the principle of sphere separation allows the market to operate freely and
efficiently without the distortions created by the intervention of the state, which he often refers to
as “Leviathan.” Only the operation of the market, furthermore, will create the wealth needed to
establish the material conditions essential to the flourishing of the human person thatCath olic
teaching regards as the goal of a just society. Any state attempt to intervene in market relations,
or in the exercise of economic liberty, for the purpose of wealth distribution or achieving “social
32

Mark A. Sargent, Competing Visions of the Corporation in Catholic Social Thought, 1 J. Catholic Soc. Thought
561, 574-81 (2004).
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justice” (a term Novak derides) is not only an infringement on human freedom (and hence
dignity), but an undermining of the goal of wealth maximization, the only legitimate goal (for
Novak) of the economic sphere.33 This line of reasoning is obviously congruent with
neoclassical economics and law and economics.
What is notable for my purposes here is Novak’s insistence that this economicallyinformed view of the world is “Catholic,” and that Catholic or other Christian thinkers who
criticize it are crypto-socialists who do not understand their own religion. According to Novak,
those Catholic and other Christian thinkers who have criticized his version of economics from a
communitarian perspective, or have contested neoclassical economics’ view of human nature, or
have insisted on the primacy of distributional or other social justice goals, have distorted
Catholic and Christian values by injecting into them entirely foreign and secular socialistic
ideologies. Economic liberty, wealth maximization and the subordination of distributional goals
constitute for Novak not just good economics, but the true Christian message. Indeed, he regards
the democratic capitalist system as a sign of God’s grace in the world.34
Bainbridge, an influential law and economics scholar principally interested in the law of
business associations and securities regulation, has done original and provocative work
extending Novak’s premises to law and economics per se (something Novak has done only
glancingly). Bainbridge’s work has extended from a general apologia for law and economics
from a Catholic (and more broadly Christian) perspective to specific analyses showing how

33
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certain CST critiques of corporate governance and corporate law are both bad economics and
erroneous applications of CST principles.
Bainbridge’s apologia for law and economics rests partially on the standard defenses:
•

Legal sanctions constitute a cost for engaging in certain activities, thus “changing a
legal rule is no different from any other change in price.”35

•

A legal rule is thus “just as subject to economic analysis as is the price of a
commodity.”36

•

“The bedrock principle of normative economics analysis is wealth maximization; that
is, law should seek to increase social wealth, as measured by the dollar equivalent of
everything in society.”37

•

Wealth maximization is crucial to implementation of the efficiency principle.
Understanding wealth maximization in terms of efficiency “shifts the burden of proof
to the opponents of the wealth maxim.”38

•

While it must be acknowledged that “law and economics is an instrumental mode of
reasoning that must be constrained and guided by exogenous norms,” such as “Other
Justice” considerations, the implementation of such norms creates serious problems.
Public choice theory shows, at least in the legislative area, decisions made in the
name of distributive justice usually reflect only interest group pressures.39

As just suggested, all of this is standard apologetics for law and economics, and there is nothing
particularly Catholic about it. To his credit, however, Bainbridge offers a deeper defense that
does, in fact, attempt to draw on the Catholic worldview.
He does so by asking whether the wealth maximization norm and the rational choice
theory that underpins it can be reconciled with Christianity: “How can Christians associate
35

Bainbridge’s articles on Catholicism and corporate governance are: Stephen M. Bainbridge, Catholic Social
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Debate, 4 Vill. J. L. & Invest. Mgmt. 3 (2002). Also relevant is his Corporate Decisionmaking and the Moral
Rights of Employees: Participatory Management and Corporate Law, 43 Vill. L. Rev. 741 (1998).
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themselves with a normative principle explicitly intended to maximize wealth and whose
measurement of wealth includes only those preferences having monetary value?”40 (Note that
Bainbridge uses throughout his apologia the narrower concept of “wealth” rather than utility
maximization.)41 Bainbridge recognizes correctly that it is the vision of human nature implicit in
rational choice theory that is at the heart of the question: “‘Economic Man’ is an autonomous
individual who makes rational choices that maximize his satisfaction. The question before us is
whether the economic view of human nature is consistent with that of Christianity.”42
Bainbridge’s answer to that question is essentially twofold: a non-theological and a
theological answer. The non-theological answer is again a standard law and economics
argument. “Economic Man,” he emphasizes, is “not intended to describe real people embedded
in a real social order.”43 The concept simply provides a mechanism for describing how people
choose between alternatives.44 It presumes rationality in the decisions made by people to satisfy
their preferences - - whatever those preferences may be.45 As such, law and economics rests on

40

Id. at 214-216

41

Id. at 209

42

See note 38 supra. By rejecting the broader utility maximization principle, Bainbridge presumably adopts a more
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At some point in the story, one senses that the account is following the first interpretation,
motored by misanthropic glee: the agents in question all seem single-mindedly devoted to
pursuing their own profit or power or pleasure. One objects--surely there’s more to it than that!-and the economist backtracks to the second interpretation, saying patiently, “no, by utility
maximization I just mean the formal structure, any content will do.” But then, within minutes--or
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Herzog, supra note 6, at 898-99.
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an “economic model of behavior [that] adequately explains the behavior of people engaged in
exchange.”46 It thus does not matter, concludes Bainbridge that “Economic Man is an imperfect
model of human behavior.”47
Bainbridge’s theological response is more original, and raises a question about his claim
that Economic Man is just an imperfect but useful model of human behavior. He returns to the
basic limitations of rational choice theory. The formation and nature of human preferences is
beyond economics.
Here’s the ticket: price theory tells us how people will choose, but as R.H. Coase
notes: It does not tell us why people choose as they do. Why a man will take a
risk of being killed [by crossing a busy street] in order to obtain a sandwich is
hidden from [economists] even though we know that if the risk is increased
sufficiently, he will forgo seeking that pleasure. In other words, economics has
no good account of the character or origins of human preferences.48
It is here, Bainbridge argues, the Christian faith “brings something to the table:”
Christianity is not a utopian faith but rather is quite realistic about human beings.
In particular, our central doctrine of the Fall of Man tells a coherent story about
the nature and origins of human preferences in an unredeemed world. In my
view, the assumptions about human behavior made by economists are largely
congruent with the fallen state of man. If Economic Man is a fair description of
Adam after the Fall, the rational-choice model used in economics is not a bad
model for predicting the behavior of fallen men. At the same time, however,
because Christianity’s account of how man fell and the consequences of that Fall
provide an answer to Coase’s question about human preferences, our faith gives
Christian practitioners of economic analysis a more fully realized account of
human behavior.49
Furthermore, Bainbridge argues that if Economic Man and Fallen Man bear a rough equivalence,
then law and economics provides not only an accurate basis for modeling human behavior, but a
sound normative basis for ordering society. This might, however, seem counterintuitive from a
46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id. at 222.

49

Id.
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Christian perspective, as Bainbridge acknowledges when he points out that “Christians are called
to a higher standard of behavior than that of Fallen Man.”50
It cannot be assumed, however, that most people, whether Christian or not, will overcome
their fallen nature, and it should not be believed that society actually can be organized on the
assumption that they will be able to do so. Bainbridge thus argues that
[I]f the purpose of economic analysis is to predict how people will respond to
changes in legal rules, however, can we assume Christian behavior by the masses
of a secular and Godless society? No realistic social order can assume “heroic or
even consistently virtuous behavior” by its citizens. A realistic social order
therefore must be designed around principles that fall short of Christian ideals. In
particular, the rules must not be defined in ways that effectively require every
citizen to be a practicing Christian. Christian visions of justice therefore cannot
determine the rules of economic order. Instead, legal rules and predictions about
human behavior must assume the fallen state of Man, which is precisely what I
have tried to suggest Economic Man permits us to do.51
For Bainbridge, therefore, law and economics, while not precisely “Christian” or “Catholic”
itself, has an affinity with the Christian view of the fallen nature of man and hence with a
Christian view of the constraints on human ability to create a just society. There is certainly no
tension between the two for Bainbridge, as he concludes that “a Christian scholar may rely on
both positive and normative economic analysis with confidence that it is both a powerful
analytical tool and one that is consistent with his or her walk with God.”52
Bainbridge’s argument is impressive both in its originality and in its ambitious
harmonization of law and economics and Catholic Christianity. He has formed the argument in a
subtler and more convincing manner than Novak. But is he right?

50

Id.
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Id. at 223.

- 15 -

III.

The Limits of Law and Economics
Bainbridge’s reconciliation of Christianity and Economic Man is ingenious in its linking

of rational choice theory, utility maximization and our fallen state. Human selfishness, for the
Christian, is one of the consequences of the Fall; rational utility maximization thus may be an
accurate way to describe how the fallen will tend to act. There is perhaps an inconsistency
between Bainbridge’s initial insistence that Economic Man and rational choice theory simply
constitute a useful predictive model, rather than a description of human nature and his
subsequent conclusion that in the Christian view Economic Man is actually the way people really
are, but be that as it may.
More troubling is the corollary of Bainbridge’s equation of the two. Even if we assume
that Economic Man acts something like Fallen Man, as a descriptive matter, does that mean that
the prescriptive goal of economics (helping Economic/Fallen Man maximize his preferences,
whatever they are, as efficiently as possible with the sum of those preferences being the sole
measure of social welfare) is also “Christian”? To be sure, Fallen Man will act selfishly to
pursue his own interests, and will do so rationally to the extent possible, and a type of well-being
will be achieved through legal rules that efficiently maximize his utility, i.e., help him get what
he wants. For law and economics, however, that is the end of the story. From a Catholic
perspective it cannot be. The reasons it cannot be the end of the story suggest not only that
Bainbridge’s equation of Economic Man and Fallen Man takes us only so far, but also that there
are serious tensions between the two world-views’ understandings of the human person, the
nature of civic happiness, and the purpose of economics.
Note, however, that my identification of this tension, and consequent skepticism about
the ultimate value of law and economics, does not presume that “economics” is irrelevant. To
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the contrary, this analysis presumes that concepts of neoclassical economics such as rational
choice, efficiency, game theory, rent-seeking, the principal-agent problem and much more
“ought to be in the toolkit of any self-respecting social or political theorist,”53 whether Catholic
or not. Indeed, there is nothing Catholic about wasting money, and our moral responsibility for
faithful stewardship of God’s earthly gifts requires understanding and application of efficiency
principles. The question is how far those concepts can take us. Can they replace the Catholic
moral tradition of meditation upon virtue and the Good as a guide to decisionmaking in law?
Recognizing the relevance of economics, furthermore, also requires recognizing that the
neoclassical economics from which law and economics derives is not the only kind of
“economics.” Much as law and economics scholars such as Bainbridge and Shavell draw on the
theoretical framework of economists such as Coase, Becker, Stigler, Friedman and others, this
analysis also will draw on the work of economists, but economists of a very different type.
Notable among them are the Italian Catholic economists Antonio Genovesi,54 Stefano
Zamagni,55 Luigino Bruni56 and Benedetto Gui,57 who have articulated a vision of economics as
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oriented toward production of civic happiness that is deeply informed by Catholic social
teaching. Much of the following discussion reflects their work.
A Catholic critique of law and economics should proceed on several distinct, albeit
related levels. First, there is a foundational philosophical disagreement between rational choice
theorists and Catholic thinkers. Rational choice theory’s (and game theorists’) view of human
nature and the purpose of life is rooted in Hobbes. As Peter Berkowitz (a non-Catholic political
philosopher) has pointed out accurately, “With Hobbes . . . the game theorist supposes that the
world is matter in motion and nothing more; that there is no greatest goal or ultimate aim, no
human perfection or salvation; that the primary and only salient motive for human conduct is
rational self-interest.”58 Opposed to the quintessentially modern Hobbes (and his intellectual
heirs among economists) is the distinctly religious Catholic conception of personhood:
incarnational, capable of redemption, and oriented toward salvation. Humans are fallen, but
redeemable. That person is capable of more than utility maximization, should not be regarded as
interested only in utility maximization, and may be judged in a moral framework that values
something greater than the autonomy needed to satisfy individual preferences.
Second, rational choice theory and welfare economics assume that the ends of action - the purposes of choices - - are beyond the ability of economics to evaluate normatively. Law and
economics, which is dependant for its analytical force on rational choice theory, “disclaims all

Between Market and Solidarity, in J.S. Boswell, F.P. McHugh & J. Verstraeten (eds.), Catholic Social Thought:
Twilight or Renaissance? 239 (2000).
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Luigino Bruni & Benedetto Gui, Quattro parole su economia e communione, in Bruni & Pelligra (eds.), Economia
come impegno civile, supra note 56, at 191; Benedetto Gui, Sharing That Builds Universal Brotherhood, 43 Living
City (June 2004), at 20.
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concern with the ends of action,”59 hence what I have described as the “irrelevance of values.”
In contrast, the Catholic tradition, grounded in Aristotle and developed through Aquinas, insists
on the capacity of reason to deliberate about ends and not just means. Ends (or preferences) may
be shaped by reason and directed toward the Good.60 For Catholic thinkers that end, the ultimate
good, is God,61 but the secularist can substitute alternative conceptions of the Good. Law and
economics’ insistence on the irrelevance of ends is a sharp break with both the Catholic and
secular Aristotelian tradition, making it ultimately inadequate from those perspectives as a guide
for deciding and acting.
Third, the concept of human flourishing central to Catholic social thought is far richer
and more complex than the utility maximization norm of law and economics. Here, the
difference is once again rooted in Aristotle, particularly the Aristotelian notion of “happiness,” or
eudaimonea. This notion is quite different from the concept of “pleasure” derived from
utilitarianism and understood in neo-classical economics and law and economics as the
consequence of utility maximization. For Aristotle, that pleasure is a transitory, neutral state; it
does not constitute subjective well-being, or happiness. Happiness is a byproduct of being
virtuous, in particular of practicing the civic virtues.62 The civic virtues are particularly
important because the human person is inherently social (a key concept in Catholic social
thought as well as Aristotle). In modern economic terms, the human person is other-oriented and
derives satisfaction form amassing “social capital.”
59
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These Aristotelian notions were built into Catholic thought about ethics and politics by
Aquinas,63 and through him into Catholic social thought, with Catholic social thought’s emphasis
on the relational nature of happiness, the obligations of reciprocity, and the common good as a
constraint on wealth and property rights. They were brought into Catholic thinking about
economics by Antonio Genovesi, a cleric and principal figure of the Neapolitan enlightenment of
the 18th century, who used these Aristotelian/Aquinian concepts to define the purpose of
economics as bringing about pubblica felicità, or public happiness, in which the goal of market
relations is not simply to maximize the wealth of each individual but to secure the happiness of
others and of society in general. Genovesi recognizes that each individual will pursue his own
interests (act “rationally” in modern terms), but if he only pursues his own interest, and ignores
the civic virtues, neither the individual nor society will achieve true happiness, because
happiness and virtue are bound inextricably. Luigino Bruni explains this paradox in Genovesi’s
thinking.
In a letter we find a very clear sentence synthesizing Genovesi’s theory of
happiness as eudaimonia and its paradox, “every man acts looking for his
happiness, otherwise he would be less of a man . . . The more one acts for interest,
the more, if he is not mad, he must be virtuous. It is a universal law that it is
impossible to make our happiness without making others’ happiness” (Genovesi
1764, p. 449). Here it is affirmed that man acts according to his own “interest.”
Interest however means “happiness,” and one can only reach happiness/interest
indirectly, by being virtuous. Virtue here is civic virtue, that is, other-oriented,
genuinely social. Finally, happiness is a “by product” of this virtuous/social
behavior.64
Where economics went wrong, Bruni argues, is in the decision to equate “happiness”
with “pleasure,” jettisoning the Aristolelian/Aquinian connection between happiness and virtue,
particularly the civic virtues, for the sake of the value-neutral (virtue-indifferent) concept of
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utility maximization.65 This move elevated purely instrumental tools such as rational choice
theory, utility maximization, and the concept of efficiency into the sum total of economics,
leaving no place for reasoned deliberation about ends or consideration of the real sources of
human happiness – the virtues.
Fourth, economists inspired by Catholic social thought such as contest the core
assumption “that values are just a datum,”66 and that “‘some of the most intrinsically human
peculiarities of the economic agent such as his notions of justice, honor, loyalty and also his
vaguest hopes and illusions [are] pre-economic data, or ‘accidental deviations from the rational
norm’ which reciprocally compensate within the vast body of data.’”67 Their presumption is that
economic analysis needs to have some account of how virtues such as benevolence, sympathy,
trust and solidarity are crucial to the operation of the market. The key aspect of all those virtues
is that they are relational; they all involve the individual’s relationship with the other. This
strikes at the individualistic core of neoclassical economics and law and economics – the
“sovereignty of individual preferences.”68 This sovereignty presumes an individualistic
anthropology, which to economists grounded in Catholic social thought, such as Zamagni, “is
inadequate because its vision of the concept of person denies precisely what is essential to a
person: interaction with others and the relationship to others as a value per se.”69 It also
presumes that humans are satisfied (“happy”) merely so long as they have the freedom to choose.
But that freedom is purely individualistic, and not sufficient to produce happiness in the
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Aristotelian sense. To Zamagni (and Catholic social thought) true freedom is not merely the
exercise of choice, but the incorporation of each person’s “deep, vital need for the other. It is the
relation ‘with’ the other which is crucial to freedom, not the relation ‘to’ others per se . . .
Robinson Crusoe may maximize his own utility, by himself, but for him to be happy, there must
be Friday.”70
IV. Conclusion
Where does all this leave law and economics? Its descriptive powers remain largely
intact, but its expansive and exclusionist prescriptive claims for how society and the economy
should operate largely collapse, because its value-neutrality, indifference to ends and radical
individualism provides no insight into what is required for the happiness in which humans can
truly flourish. In short, law and economics provides useful descriptive and analytic tools, but
from a Catholic perspective they are tools of inherently limited value. Law and economics does
not provide an acceptable framework for determining what ought to be, because of the limits it
imposes on its own capacity for moral judgment and conceptualizing human happiness. As a
result of these self-imposed limitations, law and economics and Catholic thinking about law do
not so much conflict as diverge onto separate paths.
Prescriptive law and economics begins and ends with social welfare as the maximization
of individual preferences. There is no conception of the common good apart from the
satisfaction of individual preferences; indeed it is believed that such satisfaction is the only way
to achieve social welfare. This relentless orientation toward the self, however, is ultimately
antithetical to Catholic thinking about economic life, which emphasizes reciprocity, otherorientation, the social nature of happiness and the promotion of civic virtues. The goal of a
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Catholic economics is not the creation of a societas perfecta or a communal utopia—Augustine
taught us that perfection is for the City of God, not the City of Man—but the creation of an
economy and society that is more virtuous rather than less, and that the world, while fallen, is
capable of redemption.
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